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Towards a Monumental Phenomenology:
Paul Ricoeur and the Politics of  Memory
James Ambury
The interplay of  ideology and utopia appears as the two
fundamental directions of  the social imagination. The first
tends toward integration, repetition, and a mirroring of
the given order. The second tends to disintegration because
it is eccentric. But the one cannot exist without the other.
— Ricoeur, “Ideology and Utopia,” 323
On the deepest level, that of  symbolic mediation of  action,
it is through the narrative function that memory is
incorporated into the formation of  identity. Memory can
be ideologized through the resources of  the variations
offered by the work of  narrative configuration.
— Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 84-85
The purpose of  this paper is to explore the relationship between the
two poles of  the social imaginary—ideology and utopia—and the
political role of  memory in the work of  Paul Ricoeur. I will begin by
recalling Ricoeur’s distinction between ideology and utopia and, in briefly
recounting his arguments for their positive and perverted modalities,
address the ideological role of  memory. Given Ricoeur’s emphasis on
the importance of  memory and its ideological function in societies, we
find that the Ricoeurean call for a positive ideology is at the same time




Having thus framed the discussion, I will suggest that, while Ricoeur’s
phenomenology of  memory attends to its inscription through language
as history, his argument for the transition from individual to collective
memory must be supplemented with a more robust, intersubjective,
experiential account of  memory that can better account for the positive
ideological contribution of  memory in a way that does not lead to its
perversion or manipulation. This will not move us very far from
Ricoeur’s work on text and action, which contains within it the
beginnings of  the recognition of  the importance of  non-linguistic
symbols. Suggesting an analogy between reading and the act of
memorialization, I will call attention to places of  memory, and
specifically focus on the political monument, which spatializes memory
for the purposes of  engendering an intersubjective memorial experience.
To conclude, I will briefly suggest the need to augment Ricoeur’s work
further by attending to the question of  the interpretation of  monuments,
a question directly related to Ricoeur’s insistence that democratic
structures do not avoid conflict, but actually institutionalize it.
Ideology, Utopia, and Memory
While ideology is commonly understood in Marxian terms as
a perverted set of  values that one class imposes on another, the
importance of  Ricoeur’s view is that it reminds us of  the necessity of
ideology in any society. The claim that ideology masks the interests of
the working class for the benefits of  the ruling class by producing an
inverted image of  reality rests on the presupposition that there is a
point of  view on action from which we can judge what is real and what
is not. Echoing Kenneth Burke, Ricoeur articulates what he takes to be
the problematic approach of  most theories of  ideology: “What these
theories of  ideology fail to understand is that action in its most
elementary forms is already mediated and articulated by symbolic
systems.”1 Beneath the distorting layer of  representation under which
there are systems of legitimacy that justify a system of authority is yet
another layer of  symbolic systems constitutive of  action itself. There is
no society without symbolism. Society is the product of symbolism,
not the other way around: “Ideology is an unsurpassable phenomenon
of  social existence, insofar as social reality always has a symbolic
constitution and incorporates interpretation, in images and
representations, of  the social bond itself.”2
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Ricoeur argues that there is an important place for ideology in
society. The fundamental function of  ideology is to consolidate, pattern,
and provide a course of  action. “[Ideology] preserves, it conserves, in
the sense of  making firm the human order that could be shattered by
natural or historical forces, by external or internal disturbances.”3 The
positive function of  ideology, in this “conservative” sense, is to provide
the code, or structure, by virtue of  which social action takes place and
in reference to which it is interpreted. The dysfunctioning of  ideology,
which Ricoeur calls distortion or dissimulation, occurs when ideology
moves from serving as the source of  authority to serving as a means
of  domination. In dissimulation, the legitimate use of  power becomes
the unsanctioned and oppressive use of  force. Further, when the
principle ideological schema of  social interpretation cannot
accommodate new or different experiences, they are marginalized or
ignored in the name of  social unity.
While his early work on ideology attends to the importance
of  founding events and stories that legitimate any social group and
serve as a source of  motivation for social action, it is only with his later
work, specifically in Memory, History, Forgetting, that Ricoeur treats memory
as an integral element of  ideology. But he does so only under the heading
of  abuses of  memory, specifically in a section concerning manipulated
memory. At a very basic level, in traditional societies without a
hierarchical power structure, there is only symbolically mediated action.
There can be no abuse of  memory, no dissimulation that legitimates a
system of  authority since, for all intents and purposes, there is none, at
least in any Western, vertical sense. However, “It must be added straight
away that this constitutive function of  ideology can scarcely operate
outside of its second function—the justification of a system of order
or power—nor can it operate even potentially apart from the function
of  distortion that is grafted onto the preceding one.”4 Hence, Ricoeur
claims, when all is said and done, ideology revolves around power.
This analysis of  ideology bears an important consequence: certain
memories, for the sake of  legitimizing a system of  authority, must be
forced: “Imposed memory is armed with a history that is itself
‘authorized’, the official history, the history publicly learned and
celebrated.”5 Forced memories are ideologically necessary to guard
against the forgetting of  certain events and moments of  our historical
past that constitute the social bond.6 It is in this way that ideological
memory serves its positive, integrative function.
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While ideology is one pole or direction of  the social
imagination, the other pole is utopia. Utopia may be defined as “the
imaginary project of  another society, of  another reality, another world.
Imagination is here constitutive an inventive rather than integrative
manner.”7 Utopia, far from being the enemy of  ideology, is the
dialectically counterpart of  ideology. At the pole of  utopia, we look at
reality as though from “nowhere”; we imagine different ways of  using
and distributing power: we imagine different structures of  the family
and create new possibilities for politics, economics, and religious life.
As the counterpart to ideology, which, when functioning positively
performs the social task of  integration, utopia, in its positive function,
accomplishes the task of  subverting the social order for the purpose
of  envisioning new possibilities. Ricoeur’s claim is that a society needs
both ideology and utopia, as different poles of  the social imaginary, to
maintain a healthy tension that generates a constitutive function for
the imagination and prohibits either pole from degenerating into its
respective perversion.
Just as ideology finds its perverted modality in dissimulation
or distortion, utopia, too, may be perverted in the modality of
schizophrenia: “This pathology is rooted in the eccentric function of
utopia. It develops almost as a caricature of  the ambiguity of  a
phenomenon that oscillates between fantasy and creativity, between
flight and return.”8 Schizophrenia, as the perversion of  utopia, is a
kind of  escapism by which praxis is eclipsed and replaced by static
models of social life in the name of the demand for immediate
perfection. Avoiding schizophrenia requires the admission that, no
matter the clarity of  social life in utopian thought, utopia is always in
reference back to, and never fully disengaged from, ideology: “It is as
though we have to call upon the ‘healthy’ function of  ideology to cure
the madness of utopia and as though the critique of ideologies can
only be carried out by a conscience capable of  regarding itself  from
the point of  view of  ‘nowhere’.”9
Given this short account of  ideology and utopia, our main
problem may come more clearly into focus. Ricoeur argues that ideology,
in its most positive form, is a necessity to all social groups. What remains
unclear, however, is the question of  the maintenance of  this healthy
modality in terms of  collective memory. Why is it, we might ask, that in
his great work on memory Ricoeur only addresses the ideological
function of  memory in its negative function as forced and manipulated
memory? Does he suspect that the memory necessary to ideology will
TOWARDS A MONUMENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
109
inevitably become oppressive? Further, how are we to maintain memory
in its positive ideological modality without allowing it to become
perverted? While one may agree with Ricoeur about the importance
of  memory and its relationship to ideology, it is necessary to supplement
his account with an analysis of  collective memory that attends more
fully to its intersubjective character and which addresses the question
of  its positive function. To develop such an account, I think we can
take a cue from Ricoeur himself, who, at various moments, stresses the
important relationship between memory and place.
From Memory of  Places to Places of  Memory
Ricoeur establishes a number of  polarities in his
phenomenology of  memory, one of  which is reflexivity/worldliness.10 One
does not merely remember oneself  seeing or learning, but one
remembers oneself  seeing or learning in a particular situation. While
the pole of  reflexivity accounts for the inwardness of  memory, the
pole of  worldliness accounts for the drawing outward of  memory,
from the notion of  corporeal memory to my body in relation to other
bodies in lived space. These poles are not to be thought of  as complete
opposites but modalities of  which different memories partake to
different degrees. Take, for example, my memory of  writing this paper.
This memory, while it retains worldly elements, is focused mainly on
my solitary exchange with texts, notes, and a computer. The memory
of  my presentation of  this paper to a group of  academic peers, while
it retains its solitary elements, is much more focused on the
intersubjective element of  the original experience.
Ricoeur then makes a transition from corporeal memory to
memory of  places. When we speak of  corporeal memory, we may
either speak of  the body as event or as habit.11 Corporeal memory is
enacted in a manner similar to other habits, such as learning to drive a
car. But Ricoeur argues that the body-as-habit calls upon a secondary
memory, recollection, or the body-as-event, to provide precise instances
of  date and localization of  the original memory. We here move away
from the pole of  reflexivity towards the pole of  worldliness. While the
dating or temporality of  memory is no doubt important, we will here
be concerned with the way in which spatiality enables the transition
from individual to collective memory.
Let us then account for the transition from reflexivity to
worldliness: “The transition from corporeal memory to the memory
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of  places is assured by acts as important as orienting oneself, moving
from place to place, and above all inhabiting. It is on the surface of  the
habitable earth that we remember having traveled and visited memorable
sites.”12 Ricoeur thus offers the idea of  place as one way in which we
can account for the transition from reflexivity to worldliness. In this
transition, the focus of  our memory shifts from our own corporeality
to the intercorporeality of  the world. I remember having been at my
brother’s graduation with my family or at a sporting event with my best
friend. Indeed, it is these close relations, Ricoeur argues, that fill the
space between individual memory, that is solely my own, and collective
memory, that I share with those with whom I am not familiar: “The
memory of  having inhabited some house in some town or that of
having traveled in some part of  the world are particularly eloquent and
telling. They weave together an intimate memory and one shared by
those close to one.”13
This in-between stage of  memory, however, does not
completely assist us in our project on ideology and memory. While
Ricoeur is right to point out that memories of places shared with close
relations account for personal identity in a way that broadens Augustine’s
account of  memory in Book 10 of  the Confessions as well as Locke’s
arguments about identity and diversity in An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, we are still left to question the way in which memory
may maintain its ideological function for larger groups that eclipse the
limits of  our close relations without degenerating from serving as a
justification for authority to a mask for its domination. To answer the
question, I think, requires that we focus not on the memory of  places
but rather on places of  memory.
One place of  memory that can account for the worldliness of
memory beyond those with whom we share close relations is the place
occupied by a political monument. Instead of  a place that I remember
having visited with my family, and hence a referent for recollective
memory—though it may be this of  course—political monuments serve
as places designed for the very purpose of  memorialization. Any person,
be it me, my brother, or someone with whom I have no prior connection,
who passes through this place performs the task of  memorialization.
It is through places of  memory that we are brought together with
others for the purpose of  memorializing the past.
Ricoeur calls attention to the importance of  monuments
throughout the course of  Memory, History, Forgetting. Recounting the
work of  Edward Casey, he claims that there are three mnemonic modes
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that may account for the transition between reflexivity and worldliness:
reminding, reminiscing, and recognizing.14 Monuments, Ricoeur claims,
“function for the most part after the manner of  reminders, offering in
turn support for a failing memory, a struggle in the war against forgetting,
even the silent plea of  dead memory.”15 Characterized in this way, a
monument is a frozen object that initiates a mechanical association by
which one thing is recalled through the experience of  another, or it is
an external point of  reference for the purposes of  recalling.
I think here that we must revise Ricoeur’s treatment of
monuments. These places are not merely clues that guard against
forgetting but are places where we experience memory intersubjectively.
More importantly: we experience memory with others whom we may
know and others whom we do not know in a place expressly designed
for that task. Accordingly, monuments are better grouped under the
heading of  reminiscing: “This is a phenomenon more strongly marked
by activity than reminding; it consists in making the past live again by
evoking it together with others, each helping the other to remember
shared events or knowledge, the memories of  one person serving as
reminder for the memories of  another.”16 Accordingly, monuments
are more than just a physical inscription or representation of  researched
history. They also serve as a place wherein people are brought together
to intersubjectively experience memory in an active way. They are not
spaces of  passivity but places of  work and labor. Monuments are not
merely plastic objects that transmit a single memory but which call for
and communicate memorial experience. We will return to the question
of  the communicability of  memorialization below.
Monuments considered as places of  memory help answer
one problematic posed above—namely, how ideology can establish
certain memories without oppressively forcing them. Places of  memory
neither force themselves upon us nor are they completely arbitrary in
terms of  their content and form. They evoke a memory that is acted
and relived, without condemning us to slip into the compulsion to
repeat. In calling us to reconstitute the social bond and attend to the
ideological function of  memory by sharing in the process of
memorialization, they bring to us to the responsibility of maintaining a
healthy degree of  memory for a positive ideology.
Monuments, understood as affecting the transition from
memory of  places to places of  memory, are one manifestation of  the
way in which memory may serve its positive ideological role in a non-
oppressive way. A question, however, remains: if  the responsibility of
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maintaining a positive ideological memory is ours, how do we prevent
that very memory from becoming manipulated or oppressive? To reply
we will attend to the construction of  monuments and their relationship
to historical narratives. But our answer will only lead to further
hermeneutic inquiries concerning the interpretation of  monuments. It
is to these questions that we now turn.
The Collective Experience of  Memory
In his phenomenology of  reading, Ricoeur argues that reading,
as a structuring activity, is the operation by which mimesis3—the
intersection of  the worlds of  reader and text— is conjoined with
mimesis1—the prefigured understanding of what human action is—
and mimesis2—the configuration or emplotment of action in a historically
grounded schematized understanding of  action. It is this tripartite
mimetic operation with which I think we may align an intersubjective
process of  memorialization in terms of  place. More specifically for
our project here, as a text is to reading—a dialogical exchange involving
a reader and a text—so a monument is to the ideological task of
memorialization, executed by a multiplicity of  individuals brought
together by a place of  memory. The monument accomplishes this
bringing together, this assembling of  bodies in space, through its specific
architecture and design:
Between the lived space of  the body and the environment
and public space is intercalcated geometric space…The
act of  inhabiting is situated at the boundaries of  lived
space and geometric space. And this act of  inhabiting is
put in place only by an act of  construction. Hence, it is
architecture that brings to light the noteworthy
composition that brings together geometric space and that
space unfolded by our corporeal condition.17
Thus it is construction that brings bodies together for a designated
purpose. The architecture of  a house is different from that of  a football
stadium or an opera house, given the purpose for which they are
constructed. The architecture of  a monument is no exception.18
At the level of  mimesis1, Ricoeur speaks of  the order of  action,
the “preunderstanding of  what human action is, of  its symbolism, its
semantics, its temporality.”19 This background understanding of  the
texture of  action, or acting itself, is common to both the author and
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the reader of  a work of  fiction. It is precisely because of  this shared
background that the action of  a text is intelligible to the reader and
meaning can emerge from the text. In architecture, the background is
constituted by a “dense cultural context, or web of  constraints, which
determines methods of  construction, uses of  space, symbolic systems,
economic parameters, languages of  architecture, etc.”20 For the architect,
this background lays the foundation for the construction of  a
monument that can affect the task of  memorialization for bodies in
space, observers who themselves bring to the memorial experience a
lived knowledge of  human action, its basic signs, rules, and norms.
This basic understanding of  action on the part of  the architect and the
observers is what makes possible mimesis2.
Mimesis2 is the configurational aspect of  Ricoeur’s
phenomenology of  reading: “Mimesis, at this stage, signifies the
production of  a quasi world of  action through the activity of
emplotment. Far from being an effigy or a replica of  action, this
emplotment is its intelligible schema.”21 At this level, configuration is
governed by a schematization that is structured in a tradition. Mimesis2
brings together events that are historically contingent to form a narrative
whole by which they come to have a coherent meaning. Architecturally,
it is at this level that an architect draws up plans for the monument and
eventually constructs it. Additionally, it is here that we also situate public
debate about the monument and ask about the most effective way by
which to memorialize the past.22
It is at the level of  emplotment in narrative form that Ricoeur
places the act of  construction, which gives to a certain space its purpose:
Narrative and construction bring about a similar kind of
inscription, the one in the endurance of  time, the other in
the enduringness of  materials…And narrativity
impregnates the architectural act even more directly insofar
as it is determined by a relationship to an established
tradition wherein it takes the risk of  alternating innovation
and repetition.23
A monument thus serves to construct the space between bodies for
the intersubjective process of  memorialization within a politico-
historical context.
Finally, “mimesis3 marks the intersection of  the world of  the
text and the world of  the hearer or reader. Therefore, it is the intersection
of  the world unfolded by fiction and the world wherein actual action
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takes place.”24 This level of  mimesis corresponds with what Gadamer
calls application. In terms constructed space, this is the level of  the
actual inhabiting: “Architecture, like any other work, contains an
intentional world that emerges from that which is prefigured (given)
and configured (the poetic act). All works participate in this fusion of
horizons.”25 It is through the mediation of  constructed space that we
join our world with the worlds of  others and engage in the shared
labor maintaining ideological memory.
We now reach the crux of  the ideological import of  the political
monument: the communicability of  the experience of  memorialization.
Remarking on Kant’s aesthetics, Ricoeur claims, “Communicability is
the modality of  the universal without concepts”.26 What is
communicated is not an objective rule, nor a particular case, but the
actual play between the imagination and the understanding that never
ceases in the subsumption of  the experience in a concept. In viewing a
monument, the experience of  memorialization and interpretation occurs
and reoccurs. It is this very experience that is communicable, this act
of  reminiscing that is shared. While no doubt pointing to specific
moments in the past, monuments do not just anchor a given memory
as if  it were an impression in the soul: they provide the ground from
which we experience the intersubjective, communicable process of
memorialization.27
The objective of  the artist or the architect, then, is not to
hand over to us identical memories—in the sense of  self-same
impressions or traces— but rather to open up the possibility of
analogous experience. Remarking on aesthetic experience, Ricoeur
claims:
The perfect resolution of  the singular problem presented
to the artist is grasped in the aesthetic experience in a
prereflexive, immediate manner…in the absence of
objective universality proper to determinative judgment,
reflecting judgment—to which aesthetic experience
belongs—has, in terms of  universality, only this play
[between the imagination and understanding]; this is what
can be shared.28
It is the very task of  memorialization is what we share. Together, in our
interaction with the monument, we are brought together to remember
and maintain memory in its positive ideological modality.
Monuments, as we have seen, secure the intersubjective
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 experience of memorialization and with it the ideological function of
memory. Our final question: how is it that monuments guard against
dissimulation? To answer this question, we must shift our focus to the
interpretation of  monuments. It is through the hermeneutic function
of  distanciation that we may reinterpret monuments and escape from
ideology with what Ricoeur insists is not its opposite but rather its
dialectical counterpart: utopia.
Interpretation and the Question of  Utopia
If  monuments serve ideological purposes, in the positive sense
of  ideology, how can they contribute to utopia? That is, given that the
very purpose of  a monument is to memorialize, can it simultaneously
contribute to the imaginative variation of  utopia by which we may
escape from an ideology that has become perverted? Recalling the
analogy we drew between the labor of  reading and that of
memorializing, consider the argument Ricoeur employs when he opens
the semiological possibility of  broadening our horizon of  interpretation
by suggesting that we extend the theory of  fiction to non-linguistic
symbols. Painting, for instance, presents to thought a kind of  image
that is public because it is essentially external. Against the Platonic
claim that the painter composes a shadow-image that makes the mind
deviate from reality, Ricoeur claims, “it is precisely the externalization
of  thought in external marks which has encouraged the creation of
images which not only are shadows or similarities, but also offer new
models for perceiving”.29 The external image, because it is ambiguous,
invites and motivates interpretation and has the ability to transform
what we in ordinary language call reality.30
Like a text, a monument acquires a certain semantic autonomy
because it is cut off  in three ways: from the intention of  its author or
builder, from the capacity of  its first audience to receive it, and from
the socio-cultural conditions of  its genesis.31 With every new observer,
there is the possibility of  new interpretation. This is one hallmark of
Ricoeurean hermeneutics: given that there is always distanciation, there
will always be interpretation. By way of  the externalization of  images
in art we may come to understand the importance of  the spatialization
of  memory. The semantic autonomy of  monuments, hermeneutically
speaking, prevents, always already, a single narrative from dominating
others. It avoids an unhealthy forgetting:
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The resource of  narrative then becomes a trap, when
higher powers take over this emplotment and impose a
canonical narrative by means of  intimidation or seduction,
fear or flattery. A devious form of  forgetting is at work
here, resulting from stripping the social actors of  their
original powers to recount their actions themselves.32
Because they are hermeneutically open to mimesis3, monuments
themselves may prevent the perversion of  dissimulation. Given our
argument that monuments engender the experience of  memorialization
as such and not just the retention of  individual memories, the process
is inherently open to intersubjective reinterpretation.
The following point, however, is stronger. Consider Ricoeur’s
striking claim in Oneself  As Another:
Democracy is not a political system without conflicts but
a system in which conflicts are open and negotiable in
accordance with recognized rules of  arbitration. In a
society that is ever more complex, conflicts will not
diminish in number and in seriousness but will multiply
and deepen…[democracy] is the system that accepts its
contradictions to the point of  institutionalizing conflict.33
By extension, what we could call a democratic monument, in its very
construction, maintains a positive ideology but simultaneously
engenders reinterpretation—indeed, multiple interpretations that will
conflict—and utopian thought. In serving the conservative ideological
purpose and memorializing the past, democratic monuments are not
just open to interpretation because of  the hermeneutic reality of
semantic autonomy. Architecturally and phenomenologically, democratic
monuments are those that are constructed in such a way that the
observer is acutely aware of  his or her participation in the process of
memorialization that opens up its narrative to the movement of  mimesis3.
They leave open the distanciative possibility of  utopia, and guard against
dissimulation by giving to observers the power to tell the memorial
narrative for themselves.34 Observers come to understand their role in
constituting the predominant ideology while simultaneously
reinterpreting it to prevent its descent into the perversion of
dissimulation. Such monuments admit of  the greatest degree of
polysemy without completely abandoning their ideological, memorial
function.
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Beginning with Ricoeur’s analysis of  ideological memory and
introducing the question of  its maintenance without perversion, we
found that monuments, as places of  memory, serve to guard against
forgetting not just as reminders but as symbols that motivate an
intersubjective experience of  memorialization understood as
reminiscing. Having analyzed monuments in terms Ricoeur’s
phenomenology of  fiction, we said that, while monuments contribute
to the ideological function of  memory without manipulating memory,
we nevertheless bear the responsibility for constructing monuments
that are not merely interpretable but that engender interpretation. This
type of  monument we called democratic. A monument is democratic
in the sense that, while retaining the ideological-memorial ground
necessary for the constitution of  any social action, it preserves the
function of  the social imaginary by giving observers the power to narrate
for themselves and, when necessary, escape ideology through recourse
to utopian thought. In his work on ideology, utopia, and memory, it is
perhaps towards a monumental phenomenology that Ricoeur is
pointing us: what remains to be done now is a detailed
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